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Abstract
In my paper I am dealing with an area less approached in the philosophy of culture: the crepuscular area where cognitive
mechanisms intertwine with symbolic mechanisms, and in which knowledge and semiosis are intermingled. As I believe, the
differences emphasized by the cultural studies focus only on the values and symbols, on the behavioral models and rituals; but
what I intend to emphasize is that the real cultural differences target first and foremost the perception of the world and the
meaning of life.
In this paper I shall deal with five sources of cultural and ideological illusions – the technique of issue rising; the cultural
paradigm; the ideological referential; the form of life; the life horizon. In my view, these very sources of illusion generate
pictures of the world based on which individuals, professional groups and social classes, peoples and civilizations render the
world and human life meaningful. When we talk of cognitive devices by means of which billions of men and women give a
meaning to their own life, the distinctions between illusion and reality seems to become irrelevant…
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1. Introduction
The connection between the inter-individual and intercultural communication becomes obvious if we understand
culture as Chombart de Lauwe defines it: “a series of models, of guiding images, and of representations which the
members of a society refer to in their actions, their work, and their social relations.” (Chombart de Lauwe, 1970, pp.
14-21). From this standpoint, any individual appears as a carrier of a culture (subcultures, sub-subcultures, and so
on) and the inter-individual communication – as an intercultural one. Therefore, the enhancement of the barriers
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encountered in the intercultural communication called in question the possibility of communication in general, the
authenticity of any communication.
These barriers focus on any act of communication, including the professional one: both the professional
international communication (where the differences between national cultures come to the fore) and the inter-
professional communication – between architects and engineers, between managers and accountants or between
journalists and public relations experts (where the differences between the professional cultures and subcultures step
into the picture). Moreover, the researches performed by Geert Hofstede led to the unprecedented valorization of the
organizational cultures and of the report between them and national cultures (Hofstede, 1996).
The theme of the differences between illusion and reality, between opinion and knowledge, between experience
and knowledge crossed the entire history of European philosophy. In fact, gnoseology stems from Plato’s cave, that
is, the moment in which a philosopher has systematically dealt for the first time with the difference between truth
and error. However, cultural barriers are not only communicational obstacles but also ‘epistemological obstacles’ in
the meaning rendered by Gaston Bachelard (Bachelard, 1934, pp. 39-183), which cumbers the epistemic subject’s
access to an objective reality being out there and unaffected by his/her cognitive approaches1. The ones who first
seized the impact of cultural studies on epistemology, Kuhn and Feyerabend, wondered whether we could still talk
with rational legitimacy of a primary and fundamental reality which is not a construction of the epistemic subject.
Raymond Boudon pins these parents of constructivist epistemology against the wall and calls them – pejoratively, of
course – ‘anthropologists of science’, disqualifying them as epistemologists. They are liable for the abolition of the
‘objective reality’, as it has been thought by modern philosophy: ‘the notion according to which there is a reality out
there is a mere illusion: ‘the facts are what the scholars consider to be facts’ (Boudon, Bouvier, and Chazel, 1997).
Here I am dealing exactly with this area where cognitive mechanisms intertwine with symbolic mechanisms.
2. Techniques of issue rising
In her book Philosophy in a New Key (1942), Susanne K. Langer reaches the conclusion that each and every
symbolic system is connected to a certain mental structure through which individuals understand the world. If things
were like that, it would mean that we may talk of an eternal and inevitable paranoia of human communities. That we
may talk of intercultural communication as of an exchange of illusions. Finally, that man’s world is a realm of
moving sands in which there is no oasis of certainty and in which any effort to save yourself from drowning sinks
you even deeper. In other words, the efforts of reaching the truth fail in its relativization; the Romanian poet and
philosopher Lucian Blaga (1895-1961) would put it: “and what’s not comprehended / becomes even more
incomprehensible” – see poem “I do not crush the world’s corolla of wonders”, in the volume Poems of the Light,
1919 (Blaga, 1972). In comparison to such an image, Quine’s metaphor in Two Dogmas of Empiricism (Quine,
1974), who saw knowledge as a ship that cannot be anchored in any harbor for “capital repairs” and if we want to
rebuild it, we must do it while staying afloat in it, offers us a comfortable landscape in which we are still able to
float and to advance.
From Langer’s perspective, an epoch is characterized through a certain way of rising issues – more precisely
through a certain “technique” people use in order to formulate questions regarding the world they live in. And this
“technique” limits and decides the ways in which answers are supplied – in other words, it pre-determines the
production way of the enunciations, namely, of ideas, ideologies, and conceptions concerning the world. The
enunciations are always rising awareness; the questions to which they answer – very rarely; and the issues
formulation “technique”– almost never raise awareness (at least not by the average man).
Oral communication is performed on the field of enunciation, and the communication accidents are often settled
(or at least people try to settle them) at this level. Ordinary interlocutors very rarely end up tackling the nature of the
1 Research in cognitive psychology and sociology of knowledge, in linguistics, anthropology or semiotics have called into question a long
time ago the existence of some “stable and independent data” in relation to interpretation (see, for instance Sapir, 1921; Whorf, 1956; Chazel,
1987, Deconchy, 1989; Boudon, 1992; Boudon, 1997). But in this paper we are not dealing with the interpretation of such already perceived
reality, but with the perception of reality itself.
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questions (this only occurs in the so-called “specialized discussions” – scientific debates, political negotiations –
inaccessible by their nature to common sense). The question formulation technique hasn’t yet been analyzed (except
for the specialists). Let’s take an example created by Susanne Langer (Langer, 1942, pp. 3-4).
To the question: “Who created the world?” we may answer: “It was created by chance!” or “Love and hatred
created it!” or “God created it!” But if somebody answers “Nobody created it!”, he/she offers an apparent answer
that fails to satisfy the expectations of the addresser. In fact, he/she rejected the question. The organization of his/her
mind does not lead him/her to the question “Who created the world?”; for him/her, the question expresses a false
problem. The answers to this question trigger world conceptions that presuppose one or more demiurges
(mythologies, polytheist and monotheist religions). They are all tributary to the same questions (issues) formulation
technique and to the same mental organization. Of course, they vary from one epoch to another and from one culture
to another, depending on other techniques of world issue rising and on other mental organizations (intellectual,
imaginary, symbolic)2. It goes without saying that, if in a certain life horizon there is no issue rising “technique” and
mental organization leading to the question “Who created the world?”, a cultural horizon dominated by atheism
shall correspond thereto – see our study in which we developed the idea of the relation between mental organization
and life horizon (Bortun, 1980).
The conclusion that seems to gain ground is the basic impossibility of communication, of modifying the
interlocutor’s way of thinking – modification that he is aware of and he undertakes. The doubt regarding the basic
possibility of an authentic intercultural communication emerged as a result of the distinction of certain objective
limits of the language capacity of functioning as universal coin, and which render the communication either an
impossible act, or an incomplete act. This is distressing since such limits do not belong to the interlocutors but rather
to the language itself, deriving from the nature of knowledge.
What do these limits consist in, how do they act and in what conditions can they be overcome? These are some
questions we must provide an answer to if we wanted to find a rational answer to the original question: Is
communication possible?
3. Cultural paradigms
An efficient guideline for obtaining an answer to these questions is the concept of cultural paradigm, used
increasingly more over the last four decades, both in social philosophy, as well as in anthropology, psychology and
sociology. It entered these fields by means of “concept translation”, borrowed from the philosophy of science, where
it was imposed by the American philosopher Thomas S. Kuhn. He was the one to realize that theories on the nature
of science and the purpose of research in natural sciences do not concord with the scientific practice, as it ensues
from the history of science. In practice, he says, the behavior of scientists deviates from the canons which define
scientificity and even rationality (canon which we encounter both in science philosophy and in current mentality). In
positivistic view, the central concept in characterizing the nature and the dynamics of science is that of “scientific
theory” and the differentiation criterion between “science” and “non-science” is testability. For Kuhn, the core
concept is the one of paradigm, and the criterion is that of problem solving. Paradigms are models of scientific
practice that may be found in the classical scientific papers, and especially in textbooks and treatises; they underlie
the training of a disciplinary group (physicians, chemists etc.). Based on these, the one who educates himself learns
to formulate and deal with new issues. Paradigms are, therefore, “exemplary scientific accomplishments that for a
time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners” (Kuhn, 1976, p. 14).
Unlike knowledge contained in the abstract assertions of theory and in the general methodological rules,
knowledge within paradigms is tacit knowledge. Paradigms guide the members of the scientific group toward
solving new problems, without them being aware of the paradigm every step of the way. They apply it – sometimes
even creatively – but without being able to speak about it in general statements. A “communication fracture” (Kuhn)
2 In a similar, that is, “technical” manner, Geert Hofstede thinks about cultures in his book, Cultures and Organizations. Software of the mind
(1991). The Dutch author localizes the “infrastructure” of a culture in the so-called mental paradigms that he understands as “ways of thinking,
feeling and acting” which have been “engraved in the mind of an individual” (Hofstede, 1996, p. 20).
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thus appears; the followers of a paradigm cannot convince the followers of a competitive paradigm of the superiority
of their view, and they will not be able to understand and accept the others’ view. The arguments of the two groups
will be circular (they can be understood and accepted only by the researchers who are already working in the same
paradigm).
If the people that ‘inhabit’ (or are “inhabited” by) different paradigms speak different “languages” and since there
is no such thing as a neutral language, the following question will emerge: How can we “migrate” from one
paradigm to another possible paradigm? According to Kuhn, neither by logical demonstration, nor by the appeal to
“experience”. “Just because it is a transition between incommensurables, the transition between competing
paradigms cannot be made a step at a time, forced by logic and neutral experience” (Kuhn, 1976, p. 195). But then
how? Through conversion! The term, usually used to designate sudden mutation in religious faiths, is used by Kuhn
to suggest the non-rational character of adopting a paradigm. Kuhn’s theory buries for good the Hilbertian ideal of
rational reconstruction of science, of absolute communication by means of a universal language, as well as the idea
of progress in objectivity as getting closer to a pre-existent Truth, through an Ideal Language. This theory highlights
the relativity of any communication, which derives not from the “communication incompetence” of interlocutors but
from the nature of language and of knowledge itself. I have presented it as briefly as possible in its strongest version
that can be found in The Structure of Revolutions (1962), without introducing the amendments that Kuhn himself
brings in “Postscript” in 1968, comprised in the Romanian edition (see Kuhn, 1976), as well as in “New reflections
on paradigms”, comprised in The Essential Tension (Kuhn, 1982, pp. 334-359).
It suffices to replace Kuhn’s concept with the one of “cultural paradigm” in order to realize that the limits of
communication between scientists are valid also in the case of communication between any human groups – since
any group can be considered a cultural or sub-cultural community (ethnic communities, social classes, professional
groups, political parties, companies with a powerfully standardized organizational culture, etc). It suffices for two
rival (in other words, competing for the same realm of reality) paradigms to exist in order for the perceptions on
different aspects of the real to differ and to appear obstacles in communication.
By cultural paradigm I understand a coherent and unitary range of issue rising techniques which are shared by
the members of a community at some point, and which are based on a certain system of beliefs and on a
constellation of values; such a range of techniques is generating a certain vision of world. These beliefs and value
options are comprised in very simple and comprehensive fundamental assertions that are not always consciously
formulated (and not all of them are fully consciously present in mind). On the other hand, the world view generated
by the cultural paradigm is verbalized and can be expressed in assertions and theories. It comprises a perspective on
world as a whole, but also a perspective about society, about man and his place in the world, and also about his
relations with the world, with his society and his community.
Once we accept this definition, we realize that all of Kuhn’s observations regarding “disciplinary groups” remain
valid for any kind of community:
i) The partisans of rival paradigms speak of different things, even when they look “from the same standpoint” and
“in the same direction”;
ii) Competition between rival paradigms is not solved with arguments or by resorting to “facts”;
iii) The followers of rival paradigms disagree with respect to “the really important problems”;
iv) Communication between them is always partial;
v) The followers of rival paradigms are in different worlds (they see different things, in different correlations);
vi) A complete communication is possible only inside the same paradigm;
vii) The switch from one paradigm to another can occur for various reasons, which are not related to logical
demonstration or empiric “proofs”.
Fig. 1. Jastrow’s drawing
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In fact, we are dealing with different forma mentis, forms in which information is “cast”, with different ways of
thinking social reality; after all, there are different perceptions that get us close enough to Jastrow’s “duck-rabbit”
drawing (Figure 1), drawing that Wittgenstein invoked in order to persuade us that “to perceive a complex means to
perceive that its constituents are related to one another in such and such a way”. After all, paradigms are based on such
“guiding images” (Chombart de Lauwe), which we cannot confute with arguments. According to Edgar Morin,
paradigms differ in terms of extension and comprehension, so in terms of the criteria of the generality and depth level.
Albeit “global”, paradigms are not necessarily universal; thus, in a society there can be at the same time various global
paradigms (for instance, Judaism, Christianity and Islam in the Occident). As a matter of fact, between the paradigms
that coexist within the same culture, there can be multiple types of relations: mutual ignorance, mutual indifference,
juxtaposition, collaborative implication, complementariness, competition, antagonism, intolerance. Morin (Le
paradigme perdu, 1973) speaks of “big” paradigms and “small” paradigms, of “adverse”, “intolerant” paradigms etc.
As he sees it, a “big paradigm” controls both the theories and the reasoning, and the cognitive field in which theories
and reasoning are created. It controls epistemology itself that controls theory and even the practice that the theory refers
to. Individuals of a community know, think and act according to interiorized culturally inscribed paradigms (Morin,
1999, pp. 34-36).
4. Form of life and interests of knowledge
One of the most important contemporary thinkers that demonstrated the existence of a linguistic conditioning of
knowledge – including the scientific knowledge – is Jürgen Habermas. The central topic of his study Knowledge and
Interest (1968) is the meaning of the conceptualization in sciences; the un-puzzling of this problem had pinpointed
at the same time the existence of some “knowledge-constitutive interests” that is of some “fundamental orientations”
that derive from the “imperatives of the social-cultural form of life related to work and language”; inside the “form
of life” the experience objectivity conditions are set (Habermas, 1983). In other words, it is not the “objective
experience” – which can be defined in terms of positivism – that determines success in work and communication but
the other way round: “the form of life” determines what is considered, at a given point, objectivity.
Through this Copernican reversal, Habermas leads the way to a withering criticism of the neo-positivist theory of
science. The positivist conception sees as universal model of objectivity the knowledge drawn from the natural
sciences, that is, exactly the knowledge that ignores its determination by interests and values. In conclusion, what
our ancestors considered to be “pure knowledge” is nothing but knowledge with a false self-consciousness, an
alienated knowledge. Habermas proves that there is a tight connection between the meaning of the enunciations and
the knowledge interests – connection that is formed in the “conditions of social-human reproduction of life”
(Habermas, 1983, pp. 121-143). If Habermas’ assertions are valid for scientific knowledge, they shall be even more
so for the common knowledge and for the natural languages. As long as our success in work and communication is
not triggered by the access to a presumed “objective experience” which would be common for all cultures and all
individuals, as long as objectivity itself is defined within some different “forms of life”, it means that there is no
neutral language – “observational” how positivists would put it – that mediates the translation of certain languages
in others.
The criticism that Habermas addressed to the illusion of a possible universal language is useful for us as well in
order to construct the illusion of the “common language as given” – this time an illusion of the common sense. Our
primary socialization, by means of language, is performed in contexts with “homogenous semiotics” (the so-called
“local semiotics”); as a rule, these contexts are our own families, followed by school – a semiotic extension of the
family (which is less valid in case of children belonging to subcultures with too different semiotics from the school
semiotics, such as Gipsy children in Romania or Arab children in France). Hence, in our primary socialization the
illusion of a “common language” appears and settles and makes us perceive its existence as a “natural custom” and
perceive its absence as an accident, as a state “against nature”. Or, as we already know, the “normal” state is rather
the inexistence of a common language and its existence represents a happy situation which most of the times must
be constructed. The absence of a common language generates reverse effects to communication, tolerance and
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cooperation. As a matter of fact, the history of the 20th Century teaches us a simple but fundamental thing for the
human condition: “As much lack of communication, as much violence!”.
This communicational skepticism can be overcome by means of the concept of “referential”, which the Swiss
philosopher Ferdinand Gonseth elaborated (Gonseth, 1975). This concept comprises new hints as regards the birth
of cultural and ideological illusions, as well as the directions in which the obstacles in the intercultural and inter-
ideological communication could be surmounted.
5. Ideological referential and the illusion of objectivity
In a double number from 1971 of Revue Universitaire de Science Morale, Ferdinand Gonseth invokes a heuristic
episode he personally experienced, and which soon became the subject-matter of the debates dedicated to the
problem under the name of “the parable of bent fir-trees” (Tonoiu, 1978, pp. 33-34). Traveling once by train, it
stopped before Zurich and the wagon in which Gonseth was sitting remained in front of a group of fir-trees. Looking
into the window, Gonseth numbly sees how the fir-trees, with their parallel trunks “seemed to obliquely bar the
entire surface of the window”. Getting closer to the window, the illusion went away: the trees were vertical! He goes
back to his seat: the trees are again oblique! The illusion had a very simple explication but Gonseth had to move
various times from his seat to the window to realize it: the field was horizontal, the wagon stopped on uphold
position. What inside the wagon seemed vertical was in fact oblique. The train’s wagon functioned, therefore, as a
referential for the interpretation of the impression from the outside.
What really stoke the Swiss philosopher was the sudden way in which the illusory referential gave place to the
referential more compliant to reality. Vasile Tonoiu, who relates the episode narrated by Gonseth, compares this
experience to other analogue ones, as spontaneous as this, or to others, such as the one of the reversed vision glasses.
Comparisons and analogies can be made with a great number of psychic phenomena, including phenomena of social
psychology as well as with numerous cultural and ideological phenomena. It may occur to us, for instance, to judge
completely differently from one day to another a series of problems, a behavior or a whole set of values, of ideas,
etc. “In all these experiences there seems to exist something that suggest a change of referential” (idem). For a better
understanding of the epistemological value that we confer to the “bent fir-trees parable” it is worth mentioning that:
the train in which Gonseth was had stopped in that place (where there was no station) for the first time; it was a
premiere in the traveler experience of the Swiss philosopher who for many years had traveled from home to the
Federal Polytechnic School in Zurich. This “fact of life” illustrates an “epistemic fact”: the existence of an a priori
in the described experience: the conviction that the train was positioned on an horizontal portion of the route
(whence the reference to the vertical of the train wagon as to an absolute vertical).
Processing this troubling experience, Gonseth defines referential as follows: “a figuration that a subject makes
regarding his surrounding environment. Based on this figuration, the subject shall interpret his perceptions which
thus have a value of figuration referred to a setting – he himself being a figuration of the situation. In general, this
setting is not experienced as figuration. On the contrary, it comes over as reality” (Tonoiu, 1978, p. 32).
Gonseth’s concept targets an individual rather than collective, a perceptive rather than ideological referential. Its
importance resides in its capacity of accounting for the way in which observations are pre-determined, contributing
thus to the collapse of the positivist myth of a “purely objective observation”. We shall further use the notion of
referential in a collective and an ideological meaning.
Therefore, ideological referential means a system of fundamental representations and attitudes whose
undertaking we are aware of. Such representations and attitudes “silently” govern any ideology.
The term of ideology knew so many definitions and uses that it became necessary to define the meaning in which
it is used. In this paper, the term of ideology is used in its broadest meaning, that of “assembly of ideas and beliefs,
values and symbols, concepts and codes, mental and cognitive styles, representations and rituals by means of which
the members of a community perceive the world and treat the information, get to know each other and unite forces
for action”. Moreover, we subscribe to the distinction made by Karl Manheim between “particular ideologies:
(specific to certain groups and referring to a certain domain of reality) and “total ideologies” (specific to a culture
and referring to the comprehensive world view – Weltanschauung).
How is communication between ideologies possible? In order to capture the real seriousness of the above-
mentioned question we must take into account the fact that the difference between the two differentials does not
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amount to the re-interpretation of the same facts. By shifting from a referential to another (when it occurs) new facts
shall be observed; a new “horizon of reality” opens (Gonseth). Things occur as if they passed from one world to
another. The concept of ideological referential helps us discover a new fact which, from the perspective of other
theoretical paradigms, cannot be seen: even if people live in the same physical universe, they live, at the same time,
in different worlds. We are dealing here with an “ontological differential” specific to the human world, maybe the
real particular note of this world in comparison to the non-human world. It’s not a revolutionary idea, but a
consequence (maybe the last logical consequence) of an ancient assertion: man defines himself by thought and
language. We have seen that the production of ideas is pre-determined by techniques of issue rising that differ from
a life horizon to another, and the language is producer, carrier and transmitter of contextual experiences.
The plurimondism, which is congenital to the human world, defining the human order, shall not be taken neither
for the monadology of Leibniz which was supposed to be a general ontology principle, nor for the radical – and non-
dialectic, we might say – relativism, resulted from the contextualization and unbridled historicization of the humane.
In order to understand the functioning mechanism of the referential as source of ideological illusions and see if
communication between subjects (individuals or groups) that undertake different referentials is possible, we shall
have in view the following:
i) The implementation of an ideological referential is spontaneous; it does not depend on the subject’s option,
being determined by the subject’s position in his life horizon and the subject’s relation to the overall situation (to
the position of his life horizon both toward other life horizons and within a more general framework of the human
universe);
ii) The change of the ideological referential is possible but only provided that such position and relation also
undergo modifications;
iii) In shifting from one ideological referential to another certain unalienable requirements are maintained,
necessary to any ideology3;
iv) The successive replacement of referentials may be equal to a progress in objectivity of the knowledge and
evaluations or to a progress in the adequacy of behaviors (although this progress is neither linear nor fatal).
The change of the ideological referential could be possible only if a change occurs in the subject’s relation to the
overall situation. In its turn, the change of this relation may be performed only through the change of the subject’s
position in the group structure of society: the position within the group – for the individual subject and the position
in the social structure – for the collective subject. We shall further exemplify the notions of “position” and
“subject’s relation to the overall situation”.
6. Life horizon as an illusion factory
For the real, unique and unrepeatable individual, the real basis of his ideology is not the praxis in its totality, in a
given historical moment, but a certain form of the praxis – a determined and, at the same time, delimited concrete-
historical form. The real basis of his ideology shall be, in fact, the praxis of his group of origin, and this is just the
reason why the individual’s ideology is super-determined by the ideology of his group. The membership to a certain
social group provides the individual a certain place in the structure of social relations, which shall compel him to
take from this assembly a certain set of relations. This set of relations shall form the content of his life horizon, that
is, it shall determine the ensemble of his life experience, circumscribed to the needs system and to the available
means of satisfying them. Being connected to certain needs and interests, to certain activities and having a certain
position in the assembly of social life, the group shall undertake a certain ideological referential. The individual
shares both his life horizon and his referential with the other members of the group that he belongs to. Individual
variations depend on his position within the group.
Getting back to the ways of changing the referentials, we will show that by “position” of a collective subject we
3 The ideals of “justice”, “freedom” “equality” are maintained, ideals that cross, along history, from an ideology into another or which we
find, at a given point, in more ideologies (including the concurrent ideologies). Of course, these ideals receive “theoretical definitions” that vary
from one ideology to another; but in their quality of aspiration, of fundamental attitudes, they function as invariables in relation to the system of
transformations.
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understand a life horizon and by “subject’s relation to the overall situation” we understand his place in the assembly
of social relations. His referential may be changed, in the first place, on the basis of real mutations that historical
evolution may introduce in the life horizon, that is, in the place and role of a group within social relations.
Analyzing the functionality of the various social groups in the assembly of global social determinism, as well as
the production of human essence, Marx reached the conclusion that by their nature, social classes are decisive
groups in both cases – thing that has been historically proven as least for the modern history of Western Europe.
Therefore, from Marx’s perspective, individuals’ ideology is determined, to begin with, by the ideology of the class
they belong to: “This subordination of the individuals toward class develops into subordination toward all sorts of
ideas, etc.” (Marx & Engels, 1962, p. 155).
In my view, the class is not the only factor that determines the life horizon, as Marx believed. It is marked by the
intersection of numerous factors among which some have been discovered a long time ago and used in the
sociological research (historical epoch, social formation, class, people, nation, nationality, work group, profession,
type of activity, residence environment, sex, age, etc.) and others are so discreet, so infinitesimal that they haven’t
yet been discovered (and it’s likely they will never be); these are the elements of the subject’s history that more
often than not remain some “variables” even for him, but which contribute to his “biography” and, through it, to the
construction of a certain referential.
This aspect seems crucial for a unitary theory of ideological illusions: it’s the hidden plurimondism of human
existence. Although apparently we live in the same unique and unitary world (and from the point of view of general
ontology we indeed live in a single world), practically we live in different worlds that coexist and communicate
within certain limits. Any efficient intercultural and inter-ideological communication shall have to take into account
the existence of these communication limits between the worlds. What shall we understand by plurimondism in the
context of our philosophical monism and what implications may this philosophical idea have at the level of an inter-
ideological communication theory?
Let’s try to illustrate this idea as briefly as possible. A certain life horizon is characterized by certain strategies of
practical relation with the world which are connected to certain mental and linguistic strategies, inalienable to the
practical relation. The technique of practical closeness of the surrounding reality shall always reflect in a certain
technique of issue rising thereof. The technique of issue rising implacably pre-determines the system of the
problems and so the system of the solution thereto as well. The system of solutions represents either the content of a
material practice (always determined in a strict-historical manner) or the content of an ideology corresponding to
this practice (ideas, feelings and values, beliefs, etc).
Such constants of thought around which revolves the mental organization, form a referential; they play the role of
the vertical in the “bent fir-trees” parable. But the referential, by its nature, is not perceived as a referential: it
constitutes the subject’s world for whose “naturalness” he is capable of putting himself to fire and sword (and some
have literally let themselves burn on the pile of Inquisition or on other thousands of “fires” that illuminated world
history and sanctioned the madness of ‘living on another world” or the unreasoned audacity of claiming that their
world is the “real” one). If we do not confer a metaphysical significance to the term “world” (thing in itself, fixed
and neutral basis, fundamentally prior and exterior to our interventions, constructions and interpretations) and if we
talk of “horizons of reality” (Gonseth) as scenes of action, of perception, of experimentation and enunciation, we
could better understand why a referential means a world, and why the change of the referential means the change of
the world. The change of the referential compels individuals to look upon reality with another eye, driven in a new
direction. As Francois Jacob shows, referring to the history of biology, when a group of researchers adopts a new
referential, it leads to the ‘reorganization of the possible sphere, to the modification of the way of looking into
things, to the emergence of a new relation or of new objects, in other words to the change of the order in force”
(Jacob, 1972, p. 34).
7. Conclusions
To the extent that individuals do not have access to reality in some other way than through their referential, we
could say that after the change of the referential they react to a different world. The creation of the world (of the
“reality horizon” attached to the life horizon) takes place simultaneously with the articulation of a cultural horizon,
populated by cultural paradigms, sub-paradigms and meta-paradigms having, in their turn, specific languages. It is
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impossible to extract ideology from this picture, the created principle of cultural paradigms (analogically to the way
in which scientific theories are the outgrowth of disciplinary paradigms).
The differences between two ideological referentials are not radical. They have many common denominators. For
instance, great part of the vocabulary is common; what will differ however will be the meaning granted to the terms
comprised in this vocabulary. According to a famous and long-debated analysis from the Manifesto of the
Communist Party (Marx, Engels, 1969, pp. 50-55), in the ideological referential of bourgeoisie and in the ideological
referential of the proletariat, terms such as “property”, “freedom”, “country”, “family”, “education” (along with others
invoked by Marx elsewhere, such as “justice”, “logic”, “human rights”, “value”, “wealth”, etc.) have different
meanings. This is due to the fact that the followers of the two ideologies perform their activity in different worlds,
populated by different entities and relations.
The analysis from the Manifesto goes in the direction of explaining the meaning conferred to words through the
assumed ideological referential; in its turn, it is accounted for through the life horizon. Marx and Engels debate with
anticommunist ideologies from the perspective of a referential which they become conscious of, declare and
undertake and not from a presumed “objective” position that wishes to acquire “universal validity”: “But don’t
wrangle with us so long as you apply, to our intended abolition of bourgeois property, the standard of your
bourgeois notions of freedom, culture, law, &c. Your very ideas are but the outgrowth of the conditions of your
bourgeois production and bourgeois property, just as your jurisprudence is but the will of your class made into a law
for all, a will whose essential character and direction are determined by the economical conditions of existence of
your class” (Marx, Engels, 1969, p. 54). For those who know that for Marx “material” means objective (“beyond the
consciousness and will of men”) and not “economic” or “financial”, it is obvious that the authors of the Manifesto had
in view a certain life horizon when they say “material conditions of life”. When they want to bring about the
ideological referential, they shall use the phrase “selfish misconception”, as if anticipating the Habermasian theory of
knowledge-constitutive interests.
This is how they describe an ideological referential and its role in blocking the access to a de-ideologized knowledge
(de-alienated): “The selfish misconception that induces you to transform into eternal laws of nature and of reason, the
social forms springing from your present mode of production and form of property – historical relations that rise and
disappear in the progress of production – this misconception you share with every ruling class that has preceded you.
What you admit in the case of feudal property, you are of course forbidden to admit in the case of your own bourgeois
form of property” (idem). Quoting Engels from a subsequent paper, the morale would be the following: “men see in
reality only what they want and can see”.
Hence, a great conclusion can be drawn: similar to the shift from one paradigm to another, the shift from one
ideological referential to another cannot be made following the “small steps” method, under the pressure of some
logical demonstrations or under the pressure of a discourse uttered in neutral language (there is no such language).
Another conclusion is that the use of the vocabulary of a new ideology is not automatically an indicator for the
assimilation of that ideology. A necessary step to be taken is the one of translating the new language, of using it as
“native language”. The converted individual ends up thinking and acting in the language which was – not far from
yesterday – “foreign”. Bertrand Russell used a similar comparison: once we understand the logic of a new theory,
“we often need a long-lasting and serious effort to have its consent. We have to assume it, to spiritually uproot, one
by one, the erroneous suggestions of the false, albeit familiar theories, to conquer this intimacy that allows us, in
case we became familiar with a foreign language, to think and dream in that language and not to build awkward
phrases always appealing to the dictionary and grammar” (Jacob, 1972, p. 142).
This conclusion is worthwhile to be remembered because the use of the vocabulary and ideas we receive “for
granted” is too often taken for an indicator of inter-ideological communication efficiency. This false indicator is in
many cases challenged by the actual attitudes and behavior of such individuals – see, for instance, the political
behavior of the “new democrats” in Romania in the ‘90s and further on, as I have already illustrated (Bortun, 2008).
You may realize that you have been persuaded to take the side of a new ideology without being able to interiorize
and feel at ease in the world which it “shapes” or “stylizes” and which it renders coherent. In this case, the
intellectual choice has been made, but the real conversion is still pending. You may even use the new ideology, but
as a stranger in an inadequately “naturalized” environment.
To give another example this time from the history of science, we could notice that this happened to numerous
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scholars who have met for the first time the theory of relativity in the midst of their lives. They lacked the assembly
of though and expression habits that the future members of the scientific group shall acquire through their very
formation. “Many of the new ideas may be expressed in a non-mathematical language – wrote B. Russell in ABC of
Relativity (1925) – but they are nonetheless difficult on that account. What is demanded is a change in our
imaginative picture of the world. The same sort of change was demanded by Copernicus, when he thought that the
Earth is not stationary… To us now there is no difficulty in this idea, because we learned it before our mental habits
had become fixed. Einstein’s ideas, similarly, will seem easier to generations which grow up with them; but for us a
certain effort of imaginative reconstruction is unavoidable” (Russell, 1960, p. 79).
This confession of Russell must be remembered at least as analogy since it contains an alternative to the “small
steps” method: the change of the image of the world. It shall figure among the conclusion of this study: we cannot
talk of an efficient communication between ideologies in the absence of an effort of restructuring the image of the
world of whose with whom communicate and, to the same extend, to maturely call into question our own image of
the world. Besides, all great ideologies that have crossed the history of Europe are anchored in a certain
Weltanschauung. Groups that have shifted from one ideology to another have undergone a modification of
Weltanschauung, due to a new referential, due to a new life horizon, due, in its turn, to a new place in society and to
some new relations with the human world in its totality.
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